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"IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE POULTRY SECDTOR IN ARGENTINA" 
 
 




The Argentine “industrial aviculture” started by 1960. The great development of the 
poultry sector was during the 1990s as a consequence of the direct price transfer due to 
technological and organizational improvements achieved in the sector. The objective of 
this  paper  is  to  identify  how  leadership  and  entrepreneurship  have  been  important 
elements in the development of the Argentine poultry sector. The poultry sector is one 
of the faster development in Argentina and one that offers higher quality. This was 
achieved only because of great coordination due to leadership and entrepreneurship both 
at micro and macro level. 
 




Since the beginning of the process known as “industrial aviculture” (1960), Argentina 
has registered sustained growth in production, consumption and exports of avian flesh 
(see Annex). This growth was important during the 1990s as a consequence of the direct 
price transfer due to technological and organizational improvements achieved in the 
sector. In addition, Argentina has a status of Country Free of Avian Flu and Newcastle. 
 
These improvements were due not only to investments in state-of-the-art technology, 
genetic improvement and the use of better raw materials and organizational innovations, 
but  also  to  great  collective  actions  between  different  vertically  and  horizontally 
coordinated companies. Companies increased their capacities, innovated in products and 
processes,  developed  different  organizational  schemes  (governance  structures)  and 
reached new markets and consumers. 
 
Vertically, most of the companies have different levels of integration or coordination by 
more or less formal contracts. Companies generally have vertical integration in R&D 
and slaughtering, and outsource the fattening process, acting as coordinators and leaders 
of the value chain. The product (baby chicken) never leaves the property: Fatteners are 
performing a service for the leading company. Horizontally, most of the coordinating 
companies form part of CEPA (Cámara de Empresas Procesadoras Avícolas-Chamber 
of Avian Processing Companies) that works on medium and long term strategic aspects 
for the entire sector. The most important are: a) the export of fresh chicken and chicken 
pieces,  b)  the  defense  of  the  Argentine  industry  against  dumping  actions  by  the 
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This  vertical  and  horizontal  coordination  implied  a  great  level  of  leadership  and 
entrepreneurship of the companies involved in the whole business. 
 
The objective of this paper is to identify how leadership and entrepreneurship have been 
important elements in the development of the Argentine poultry sector. The secondary 
objectives are: a) identifying the patterns of companies in the sector, b) describing the 
Argentine  poultry  agribusiness  and  its  participation  in  world  commerce,  and  c) 




The  research  will  be  applied  and  descriptive  (GIL,  1994),  once  it  will  detail  the 
determinants of leadership and entrepreneurship in the development of poultry sector in 
Argentina. Methodologically, this paper has a macro-level and micro-level approach. 
The  study  of  the  sector  (macro-level  approach)  is  based  on  primary  and  secondary 
information  sources:  Interviews  with  experts  in  the  sector  (producers,  industrialists, 
chamber representatives, etc.) and bibliographical search.  
 
Primary information is based on face-to-face questionnaires that encompassed topics 
related to leadership and entrepreneurship in poultry sector. Questionnaires were done 
to  experts,  CEO’s  and  the  president  of  the  Argentine  Poultry  Chamber  (CEPA). 
Subsequent phone calls were made to clear doubts and obtain additional information to 
contextualize the answers. Each questionnaire comprised objective questions aimed at 
understanding the behavior of raisers and abattoir in the development of the sector, 
especially  regarding  how  this  sector  was  organized  by  leadership  of  those  that 
coordinate the chain. A total of six people answered the questionnaires and the data 
were treated statistically. 
 
Micro-level approach has been performed contacting CEO’s of three companies of the 
sector.  The  companies  studied  represent  50%  of  total  poultry  sector  in  Argentina. 
Understanding how the three companies developed their business was important to state 
leadership and entrepreneurial aspects at micro-level. The necessary information was 
obtained in interviews for all three companies. 
 
Applied  research  is  carried  out,  since  it  depends  on  knowledge  developed  by  pure 
research, but whose interest is knowledge application and practical consequences. The 
research has an explanatory level, taking into account that it seeks to develop, clarify 
and modify concepts and ideas, with a view to formulating more precise problems or 
hypotheses  that  can  be  researched  in  further  studies,  besides  having  a  less  rigid 
planning, not applying quantitative techniques and being carried out with more practical 
concerns (GIL, 1994). 
 
Also, the observer participator method in agro-industrial chains in the last six years is 
used  through  research  reports  and  case  studies  in  research  groups  (Food  and 
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Food Network), aimed at characterizing the key entrepreneurial elements and advance 
the  understanding  of  the  development  of  the  sector,  following  the  new  institutional 
economics theory. 
 
3. Literature  review:  New  institutional  economics,  entrepreneurship  and 
leadership 
 
In the analysis of an economic system, the institutional environment and its enforcement 
are as important as the way in which organizations develop in that environment (Palau 
&  Jatib,  2003).  Besides,  firms  that  have  the  function  of  producing  –neo-classical 
theory– and transacting –neo-institutional theory– require a certain degree of technology 
and organizational ties to carry out their activities. Organizations buy or produce the 
goods they need to produce their own goods or services, considering transaction costs 
(at least for the TCE Theory). Organizations thus appear as organizational structures 
rather than technological functions. The cost of the price mechanism, the cost of the 
market –the transaction cost– is what leads to the way of governing the transaction. 
 
The use of “more unusual” forms of governance (Ménard, 1996) is rapidly increasing in 
the agroindustry. The higher the global consumers’ quality demands and the need of the 
industry to offer its products JIT (Just in Time), the greater the asset specificity, needing 
better forms of organization and control. As a result, hybrid forms become important 
governance structures to coordinate the new level of asset specificity. Hence, the actual 
agribusiness is more contractual than price driven. Contracts represent not only secure 
price,  but  also  the  possibility  of  belonging  to  a  network  of  top-level  organizations. 
Menard (1996) states that up to now, the literature on hybrid forms has made emphasis 
on  contracts  characteristics  –arbitration  clauses,  acquisition,  taking  or  paying,  and 
measures to create “hostage” positions. But other characteristics are involved too, that 
can be seen when we look at the incentives and inter-company control agreements. 
 
Schruijer & Vansina (2004) explore the contracts and develop the concept of “multi-
organizational relationships” (MORs). This organizational form establishes that there 
exists between the parties a high frequency of transaction, as Williamson specifies, but 
there  are  in  turn  relationships  of  trust,  a  win-win  attitude  and  common  goals.  The 
authors  define  MORs  as  “the  emerging  work  system  between  two  or  more 
interdependent parties that is formed to address a concern, problem or opportunity”. 
As in this type of structure there are people involved, it is important to consider how to 
manage and promote the MORs to develop win-win activities and common goals. In 
this  context,  leadership  and  entrepreneurship  are  success  critical  factors  of  the 
relationship. 
 
The development of entrepreneurship research within economics differs somewhat from 
that  of other social sciences. Entrepreneurship is studied in virtually all disciplines, 
ranging from social anthropology to organizational theory to mathematical economics 
(Henrekson, 2007). However, what is entrepreneurship? First, it deals with individuals 
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not really matter whether the entrepreneur is the person who provokes change or merely 
adjusts to it. Entrepreneurial action can mean both creation of opportunity and response 
to existing circumstances, in the presence of which entrepreneurs have the daring to 
embrace risks in the face of uncertainty. Second, entrepreneurship is a function, one that 
is carried out by specific individuals. Given that they choose to do so, the activities may 
be productive, unproductive, or even destructive from a societal perspective (Baumol, 
1990).  
 
Baumol pioneered the role of institutions for entrepreneurial behavior; how “the [social] 
structure of payoffs” channeled entrepreneurship to different activities. If institutions 
are  such  that  it  is  beneficial  for  the  individual  to  spend  entrepreneurial  effort  on 
circumventing  them,  the  individual  will  do  so  rather  than  benefiting  from  given 
institutions  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  enhance  contract  and  product  quality.  The 
outcome in this case is expected to be one where corruption and predatory activities 
prevail over socially productive entrepreneurship. The supply of entrepreneurial effort is 
also likely to be influenced by the institutional setup. The wealthy world does a good 
job of directing entrepreneurship toward inherently productive purposes (a large part of 
the explanation for wealth).  
 
Based  on  broad  historical  studies  (Rosenberg  &  Birdzell,  North)  it  is  now  widely 
recognized that protection of private property rights is of fundamental importance for 
economic  growth.  With  secure  exclusive  private  property  rights,  productive 
entrepreneurship is likely to thrive. This follows because successful entrepreneurs know 
that they will retain the entrepreneurial rents they earn and because specialization and 
the  division  of  labor  are  greatly  facilitated,  which  broadens  the  range  of  potential 
entrepreneurial discoveries. 
 
However, how could entrepreneurial attitudes be explained in emerging countries, with 
high  uncertainty  –mainly  institutional–  and  low  respect  of  property  rights?  What 
elements do people and companies have for entrepreneurship? In this case, with weak 
institutions,  entrepreneurship  could  be  achieved  developing  collective  actions,  with 
strong influence of leaders and collaborative leadership. 
 
Literature on leadership deals with the issue of how to achieve collaboration and unity 
between groups. A collaborative leadership role is process oriented. A collaborative 
leader identifies relevant stakeholders and brings them to the table –as inclusively as 
possible–,  keeps  them  at  the  table  and  helps  them  to  deal  with  one  another 
constructively. Huxham and Vangen (2000) define leadership in multiparty situations as 
“mechanisms  that  are central  to  shaping  and  implementing collaborative  agendas” 
(p.1171). As a result, entrepreneurial attitudes in a “MOR” respond to coordination and 
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4. The Argentine poultry industry. 
 
Poultry  production  in  Argentina  goes  back  to  1857.  By  1945  there  was  already  an 
important  poultry  population,  with  a  semi-industrial  exploitation  concept  and  low 
specificity levels, with pedigreed mother lines and some double-purpose cross breeding: 
hens  for  egg  production  and  chickens  for  consumption.  Commercialization  was 
organized  through  storage  facilities  and  consignments  represented  by  individuals  or 
organized  in  cooperatives.  Most  of  the  stored  goods  ended  up  at  the  “Mercado 
Concentrador de Aves y Huevos de la Capital Federal” (Buenos Aires Consolidating 
Market for Birds and Eggs), where the most important wholesalers operated. Here most 
of the products were prepared, eggs were selected and classified for consumption, and 
live five-month-old chickens were sold at a weight of five pounds; so were other kinds 
of birds. Upon request, chickens were slaughtered and plucked; no evisceration took 
place. 
 
This  structure  continued  into  the  early  1960s,  with  slight  growth  and  progressive 
organization of the production. Chicken fatteners had invested in sheds, mostly in the 
Argentine  agricultural  production  area  (mainly  provinces  of  Entre  Ríos  and  Buenos 
Aires) in order to gain easy access to the feed necessary for chicken production. In 
Figure 1 we can see the organizational structure of aviculture in the 1960s. By then 
there were already incubator businesses that supplied baby chicks (hybrid chickens). 
These were bought (t2) by the fatteners, who fattened them by purchasing balanced feed 
and contracting veterinary services (health). Once fattened, the chickens were sold to 
middlemen or cooperatives (t3), or to brokers who visited the areas of production or 
were located near the large consumption centers. 
 
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of Aviculture in the 1960s. Source: Authors. 
 
Within  this  organizational  structure  there  existed  great  organizational  uncertainties, 
mainly due to risks inherent to production/fattening, risks related to acquiring or selling 
products  –buy-sell  uncertainty  and  price  fluctuations–,  risks  related  to  opportunistic 
actions,  and  financial  risks.  The  assets  involved  did  not  have  high  specificity: 
Specificity was mainly given by the baby chick (physical asset specificity), the fattening 
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The common governance structure was the market that generated very high level of 
“transaction costs” (at organizational level). Normally the chicken fattener had the least 
amount of information in the poultry chain and suffered these transaction costs most. In 
addition,  at  technological  level,  fixed  and  variable  costs  were  also  high,  since 
production efficiency was low (approximately 5 Kg. of feed-1 Kg. of chicken) and there 
were  high  health  risks  (mortality)  and  low  scale.  Summarizing,  this  organizational 
design generated high costs and diseconomies and, although efficiency was greater than 
that in the 1940s/1950s, total production costs were still high and generated a high price 
for the local consumer and a loss of competitiveness globally. 
 
As designed until then, the business was not competitive. The sector was not going to 
grow, and the market was going to remain small, showing low scale and efficiency. 
Starting in the 1970s, the sector began a process of organizational and technological 
modernization,  showing  a  strong  collective  development  (multi-organizational 
relationships, MOR’s) and collaborative leadership. The process of vertical integration 
and vertical coordination with the chicken fatteners started in 1976. Whoever wanted to 
be competitive had  to seize the  stages of  the  productive chains and sell a  finished, 
eviscerated chicken. The fatteners had the production know-how and the infrastructure 
(the  sheds),  but  they  could  not  afford  new  breeding  of  chicks  due  to  economic  or 
financial  incapacity.  In  addition,  the  commercial  system  based  on  “storage-
Consolidating Market-open air slaughter” could not  withstand the larger  volume, in 
quality and quantity; however, neither could the industry withstand this level of costs if 
it were looking for more competitiveness.  
 
Thus, between 1976 and 1983 the sector was partly vertically integrated, with some 
businesses producing the fertile eggs, the baby chicks, the feed, the slaughter and the 
distribution, while others opted for coordination, signing contracts with the fatteners to 
later  slaughter  and  commercialize  the  chickens.  Moreover,  the  sector  started  to 
incorporate greater amounts of technology into the processes (reproduction, incubation 
and fattening) and into the products (slaughter and finishing of the chicken). In addition, 
the slaughtering capacity of the meat processing plants was increased.  
 
What constituted a “better” governance structure for each business (vertical integration 
or coordination) depended basically on that firm’s culture (e.g., businesses that were 
originally fatteners chose to integrate vertically rather than coordinate). The first case 
appeared when the agents internalized more than one stage of the chain. For instance, 
fatteners who had fattening sheds later acquired incubating plants and then built meat 
processing plants. This is the case of Cresta Roja who was “forced” to choose this 
system due to the low number of fatteners in its production area. Vertical coordination, 
on the other hand, appeared in the case of chicken fatteners with low financial and 
managing capacity for integration and who wanted to continue in this activity. Thus, 
they  tried  to  sign  agreements  or  contracts  with  agents  above  and  below  the  chain 
(slaughterers and suppliers of baby chicks). In this case, the chicken fattener signs a 
contract  with  the  “coordinator”,  by  which  the  former  has  the  obligation  to  provide 
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chicks, the feed and the health care. At the end of the fattening process, the fattener 
receives a price per fattened chicken, adding bonuses or penalties depending on the 
efficiency of feed conversion, the use of energy or the mortality percentage. This makes 
it  possible  for  the  fattener  to  have  a  greater  incentive  to  produce  efficiently  and 
therefore have larger returns. At the same time, the coordinator lowers its production 
control costs and insures a greater number of birds to slaughter. This is the case of Las 
Camelias or Tres Arroyos. 
 
This modernization of the organizational and technological structure of the chain started 
in the mid-1970s and became consolidated in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s there were 
innovations,  mainly  at  institutional  level,  which  impacted  on  the  Argentine  poultry 
industry: Convertibility, State deregulation, privatizations and the free market (lower 
import and export taxes) generated a greater institutional stability and the possibility for 
the industry to introduce modern technology and improve the organizational model. 
Vertical integration or vertical coordination (contracts) served to safeguard the specific 
assets involved (genetic development or breeding, fattening, slaughter and distribution) 
and the total costs (transaction and transformation costs) decreased, while consumption 
went from 10 Kg. in 1970 to almost 18 Kg. per inhabitant per year at the beginning of 
the 1990s, a product of the lower prices of chicken at the supermarket. 
 
Vertical  coordination  (contracts)  was  the  most  popular  governance  structure  in  the 
poultry industry. However, it has undergone an evolution during the last 30 years. The 
first  contracts  were  very  informal  and  left  a  potential  for  opportunistic  actions, 
increasing the organizational uncertainty. The evolution of this type of contracts is dealt 
with in the Annex; it can be seen that the sector started to generate a kind of “multi-
organizational relationships” with common goals (higher profits and strong competition 
with other meats). The leader of each sub-system was the “coordinator”, mostly the 
industrialist or the breeder who then built a slaughtering and processing plant. 
 
Technologically, the leading companies that had more than one activity in the chain 
gave priority to investment in specific assets: The construction of processing plants 
following international quality standards and the purchase of reproductive grandparents 
in order to generate a greater fattening efficiency by means of genetic improvements 
(conversion rate). At the same time, they developed contract models with the chicken 
fatteners, gaining greater legal certainty regarding the property of the baby chick (by 
avoiding possible opportunistic sales of the asset to other competitors), generating a 
larger production scale with lower investment at the fattening stage, and allowing the 
chicken fattener to produce without buying baby chicks or supplies (feed and health 
services), while at the same time guaranteeing the sale of the fattened chicken (see 
annex). 
 
In conclusion, changes may be summarized as follows: a) an organizational redesign 
(lowering transaction costs, second order economy) and b) technological innovations 
(genetic, process, feeding, etc., lowering industrialization costs, third order economy). 
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production costs in the 1960s to a new world class business design (price and quality). 
Thus the habit of chicken consumption was consolidated, increasing consumption in the 
domestic market to over 25 Kg./inhab./year and the incipient export of chicken parts, 
mainly chicken claws and giblets, which allowed it to come in contact with the markets. 
 
5. Leadership and entrepreneurship in the poultry industry. 
 
Coordination in agribusiness arises as the result of applying different mechanisms that 
provide the base to satisfy the consumer’s demand, bearing in mind the incentives to 
obtain  the  expected  results  and  the  controls  of  the  agents  who  perform  the  task. 
Therefore,  in  situations  of  high  perturbation-adaptation,  hybrid  governance  and 
vertically integrated structures are chosen as the best options. 
  
The new organizational environment in the poultry industry in Argentina is based on 
“multi-organizational relationships” (MOR) as was explained in the previous chapter. 
Great entrepreneurship can be observed in all the chain, focused on the final consumer. 
Due  to  the  interviews  done  with  experts,  it can  be  said  that  leadership  has  had an 
important role in the construction of this new paradigm. But, due to the great associative 
capacity of the poultry players and vertical coordination, the MOR´s have extended 
beyond the micro-organizational activities (within agents in the same subsystem) and 
the  sector  has  created  strong  ties  between  all  players,  founding  CEPA  (Process 
Companies Chamber) and CAPIA (Fatteners Companies Chamber). 
 
These two chambers represent and lead the whole poultry sector, negotiating with the 
Government  (e.g.  taxes,  compensations,  subsidies).  Moreover,  with  the  object  of 
supplying a very competitive external market, national poultry businesses –based on 
CEPA and CAPIA– have faced the need to develop certain strategies: 
·  Guaranteeing the best health standards by isolating breeding and fattening. 
·  Insuring high quality raw materials for the manufacture of balanced feeds by 
means of systematic checks. 
·  Implementing BPM -HACCP- BPA Standards and traceability. 
·  Implementing ISO 9000-ISO 22000 Certification. 
·  Investing in state-of-the-art technology by means of: 
1.  Importing grandparent genetic lines. 
2.  Modern vaccination and birthing machines. 
3.  Research  on  avian  nutritional  needs  in  order  to  manufacture  the  best 
balanced feed for each stage of development. 
4.  Logistics of supply and distribution of these balanced feeds.  
5.  Modernization of the breeding barns and slaughterhouses.  
6.  Logistics through a network of operators who supervise the management 
of the cold chain for the products. 
7.  Telemarketing and Call Center Services for the internal market, through 









Rio Branco – Acre, 20 a 23 de julho de 2008 
Sociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administração e Sociologia Rural 
 
This entrepreneurial attitude has been possible only because there is great integration 
and coordination among the different actors of the chain. The governance structures 
“vertical  integration”  and  “vertical  coordination”  were  the  base  of  leadership. 
Leadership is not only important inside each company (and its network of suppliers, 
fatteners, etc.) but also between the different participants of the sector. The result is of 
the process is greater production, productivity and competitiveness both in domestic and 
international markets (see Annex). 
 
6. Conclusions and (management) implications. 
 
Understanding the leadership and entrepreneurship of a sector helps to identify why 
some sectors have a different evolution and competitiveness level. The poultry sector is 
one of the faster development in Argentina and one that offers higher quality. This was 
achieved only because of great coordination not only on a micro level (companies) but 
also on a macro level, through lobby organizations (e.g. CEPA), that is, by means of a 
great level of social capital. 
 
Poultry production and industrialization goes back to 1857. From its inception and until 
1970, this sector was extremely informal and showed a low level of competitiveness. 
Since the 1970s, and mainly since the 1990s, the Argentine poultry industry has been 
increasing  in  competitiveness  due  to  institutional,  organizational  and  technological 
innovations (see Annex). The reasons for these innovations have been a more suitable 
institutional  environment  and  the  capacity  of  the  whole  sector  to  work  together,  in 
collective  actions,  due  to  great  levels  of  leadership.  The  production,  exports  and 
efficiency have increased abruptly and new markets have been achieved (see Annex). 
 
The current challenge is how to grow further. The demand for avian meat is increasing 
worldwide, especially from those countries free of Newcastle and avian influenza. The 
local industry is working at full capacity. Supplying an increasingly demanding external 
market without neglecting the domestic market implies increasing the number of baby 
chicks, the fattening farms and the processing plants. This involves two fundamental 
aspects: a) investments in technology, b) a greater number of chicken fatteners. 
 
If the coordinating industry (the actual leaders of the sector) has to make the necessary 
investments to increase production –fattening farms– in a country with low access to 
credit as Argentina, no investments will be possible in slaughter and processing plants. 
Therefore, raising the number of chicken fatteners constitutes the greatest concern of 
many businesses in this sector.  
 
It is to be expected that the leadership of the sector will be the key factor in the new 
Argentine  scenario  and  an  important  element  for  new  entrepreneurial  institutional, 
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8.1.  Types of contracts in the poultry industry. 
 
OPEN ACCOUNT: This was the first type of contract developed by the different 
participants.  The  farmers  (chicken  fatteners)  were  simply  given  a  loan  to  acquire 
consumables, especially balanced feed, baby chicks, vaccines and other medicines; this 
alleviated their need for capital. Thus, the farmer contributed the capital for land and 
improvements, fixed working capital, labor, fuel and other consumables. As the farmer 
sold  the  fattened  chickens,  he  paid  the  debt  contracted  with  the  business  and  an 
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the balanced feed companies did not participate in the commercialization of the product. 
At the producers’ level, the price of chicken meat was determined by the free play of 
supply and demand: The producer took the product to market and sold it to the highest 
bidder. Of course, the transaction costs associated with this type of price formation 
through the market were high.   
GUARANTEED PRICE CONTRACTS: The leading company promised to buy the 
entire production of chickens, guaranteeing at the same time a price per unit. Thus, the 
risks associated with prices and placement of the product in the market shifted from the 
farmer to the coordinating company.  Under these contracts, when the guaranteed price 
did not cover the cost of consumables, the farmer received a difference. However, the 
farmers were still susceptible to the risks constituted by the prices of consumables and 
the high requirements of capital to pay the coordinating company in case of loss. In 
addition,  guaranteed  prices  fostered  opportunism  on  the  part  of  the  farmers,  who 
produced  low  quality  chickens  while  the  price  was  maintained  independently.  The 
advantages for the farmer consisted in a decrease of the transaction costs related to the 
process of price formation; a disadvantage for the leading company lay in the rise of 
transaction costs due to the farmer’s opportunistic behavior.  
FEE  PAYMENT  CONTRACTS:  As  in  the  contracts  mentioned  before,  the 
integrating  companies  provided  all  consumables  and  technical  assistance  for  the 
fattening of the chickens; the difference lay in that the integrating companies retained 
the property of the chickens and the farmers were only in charge of the fattening. This 
new concept in contracts reduced the risks run by the producers, who no longer became 
indebted to the integrator for the consumables: once the chickens were sold, the farmer 
received a fee for each chicken. For the integrator, the disadvantage was that he faced 
the risks of commercialization, price fluctuations, etc. For the farmer, the disadvantage 
was that payments were not based on his efficiency and his efforts were not supervised. 
These contracts stimulated opportunism, since fee payments were made regardless of 
the farmer’s performance. The  process of forming the price  of chicken  meat at the 
producers’  level  consisted  in  paying  for  the  service  rendered  in  the  form  of  fees, 
payment for the service of breeding; that is, what was negotiated in the transactions was 
the service rendered by the farmer.  
SHARED REVENUES: In this type of contract both parties figured as partners for 
the benefits, although the revenues were shared unevenly. The revenues obtained by the 
sale of the birds were shared by both parties after the integrating company had deducted 
its costs. When there were losses, the integrators absorbed them but raised the prices of 
consumables  unfairly,  lowering  the  amount  of  revenues  to  be  shared.  Another 
disadvantage for the farmer was that he was subject to price risks and to the risks of the 
integrator’s placing the products in the market. 
FEED CONVERSION CONTRACTS: offered an incentive to improve production 
practices. In addition to performance fees, the farmer received an extraordinary payment 
(or  bonus)  based  on  feed  conversion,  the  pounds  of  feed  consumed  per  pound  of 
chicken produced. In other words, the farmer received a fee plus a performance bonus; 
this arrangement precluded opportunistic behavior, since the revenues were directly tied 
to the farmer’s performance. In spite of the performance bonus, the farmer still faced the 
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includes a new element: a mechanism that applies a price formula. Therefore, there is 
no longer a uniform price, since this will vary from one producer to another according 
to the performance of each.  
COMBINED CONTRACTS: these included fee payments to the farmer, which 
were  adjusted  through  a  performance  bonus  in  order  to  discourage  opportunistic 
behavior. In this type of contract the objective is to reward the more efficient farmer by 
means of bonuses and make deductions from the paycheck of the less efficient farmer.  
COMBINATION  OF  THE  SHARED  REVENUES  CONTRACT  AND  THE 
COMBINED CONTRACT: the coordinating company supplies the balanced feed, the 
baby  chicks,  medicines,  technical  assistance  and  transportation,  and  the  farmer 
contributes the farm, the equipment, the labor and other consumables. The chickens 
belong  to  the  coordinating  company.  The  value  of  the  production  is  calculated  by 
multiplying the number of kilos of chicken delivered to the processing plants by the unit 
price;  the  latter  is  adjusted  by  means  of  a  bonus  that  depends  on  the  relative 
performance of the  producer  as compared  to that  of other farmers. The cost of the 
consumables provided by the company is deducted from the value of the production and 
the difference to the producer is calculated. This way, the opportunistic behavior of the 
farmer is reduced, as the price of chicken meat is formed based on his performance. In 
addition, the risk of production is decreased as the farmer’s performance is compared to 
the average performance of the other producers. The formation of the price of chicken 
meat at the producers’ level is established by means of a price formula mechanism. 
Below is a list of the most common contractual obligations of both parties, which will 
influence the formation of prices and costs of chicken meat for fattening. 
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Figure A.2. Evolution of avian exports (in Tons) 1994-2005. Source: SAGPyA 
 
Figure A.3. Evolution of avian imports (in tons) 1994-2005. Source: SAGPyA. 
 